From Natural Character to Moral Virtue in Aristotle      Tom Angier That natural conditions—including, paradigmatically, human biological functioning, but ranging also over extra-human conditions (such as the environment)—are deeply relevant to ethical norms probably strikes the average person as a truism. But since Hume and Kant, many if not most moral philosophers have sidelined such conditions and tried to ground ethical norms differently: typically, in contingent desire or formalistic conceptions of reason. This intellectual habit is now being seriously challenged, primarily by neo-Aristotelian philosophers—but with Mariska Leunissen's latest book, a genuine Aristotle Forscher has entered the fray. While the heavily textual focus of her work will limit its appeal to scholars of ancient philosophy, joining Aristotle's ethics up...

Humean Laws and (Nested) Counterfactuals     Christian Loew; Siegfried Jaag Humean reductionism about laws of nature is the view that the laws reduce to the total distribution of non-modal or categorical properties in spacetime. A worry about Humean reductionism is that it cannot motivate the characteristic modal resilience of laws under counterfactual suppositions and that it thus generates wrong verdicts about certain nested counterfactuals. In this paper, we defend Humean reductionism by motivating an account of the modal resilience of Humean laws that gets nested counterfactuals right.