Παρασκευή 1 Νοεμβρίου 2019

The Amaraughaprabodha: New Evidence on the Manuscript Transmission of an Early Work on Haṭha- and Rājayoga

Abstract

The Amaraughaprabodha is a Sanskrit Śaiva yoga text attributed by its colophons to Gorakṣanātha. It was first published by Kalyani Devi Mallik in 1954 and has been discussed in various secondary sources. Most notably, Christian Bouy (1994, pp. 18–19) identified this work as a source text for the Haṭhapradīpikā of Svātmārāma (mid-fifteenth century). This article presents new manuscript evidence for a shorter recension of the Amaraughaprabodha than the one published by Mallik. Comparing the differences between the short and long recensions reveals that the structure of the shorter one is more cohesive and closer to the original design of the work. The close relationship of the Amaraughaprabodha's short recension with an eleventh-century Vajrayāna work on yoga called the Amṛtasiddhi provides unique insights into how early teachings on Haṭhayoga were formulated. Although the practice of the physical techniques is largely the same in both texts, the author of the Amaraughaprabodha removed or obscured Vajrayāna terminology, added Śaiva metaphysics and framed Haṭhayoga as subordinate to a Śaiva yoga known as Rājayoga. This article proposes that the Amaraughaprabodha's short recension is probably the earliest known work to combine Haṭha- with Rājayoga, on the basis of this recension’s close relationship with the Amṛtasiddhi, its rudimentary nature and the likelihood that Svātmārāma used it, and not the long recension, for composing the Haṭhapradīpikā.

Vidyānandin’s Discussion with the Buddhist on Svasaṃvedana, Pratyakṣa and Pramāṇa

Abstract

Two of the terms in the title are from Vidyānandin’s Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika (TAŚV, 1, 6, 11), which is his commentary on Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha-sūtra (TAS). Sūtra 6 of the TAS states the following: pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ, ‘knowledge—of the seven categories—is obtained through the pramāṇas and the nayas’). Vidyānandin’s commentary on this sūtra 6 entails a total of 56 ślokas, with his own prose vārttika on each of them in varying lengths. TAŚV 1, 6, 1–8 deal with particulars and universals, for which he uses the synonymous pairs aṃśa/aṃśin and avayava/avayavin. That he is attacking the Buddhist position regarding this age old theme in Indian philosophy, is evident also in that he quotes Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇa-vārttika. By the time he comes to his TAŚV 1, 6, 6, he establishes that an object as a whole is open to perception and that the Buddhist also accepts perception as a valid means of knowledge, but does not accept the perception of an object as a whole. From TAŚV 1, 6, 11 onwards Vidyānandin continues with the same theme, elaborating his attack of the Buddhist view even further, doing so in terms of svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa and pramāṇa (self-awareness, perception and valid means of knowledge). The presentation will attempt to deal with these concepts in order to see how Vidyānandin vindicates the Jaina position vis-à-vis the Buddhist one. This presentation will continue from my previous study of Vidyānandin’s TAŚV 1, 6, 1–10.

Is There Anything Like Indian Logic? Anumāna , ‘Inference’ and Inference in the Critique of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

Abstract

The paper presents an analysis of the anumāna chapter of Jayarāśi’s Tattvôpaplava-siṁha and the nature of his criticism levelled against the anumāna model. The results of the analysis force us to revise our understanding of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa as a sceptic. Instead, he emerges as a highly critical (materialist) philosopher. In addition, the nature of Jayarāśi’s criticism of the anumāna model allow us to conclude that anumāna should not be equated with inference, but rather is its limited subset, and may at best be rendered as ‘disputational inference’, ‘debational inference’ or even ‘dialogical inference’. Jayarāśi applies a range of logical laws which clearly represent patterns of what can be classified as a priori reasoning (if we grant that there could be a priori justification for our knowledge at all) and analytical justifications for knowledge, which were traditionally not reckoned sound. Against the backdrop of Jayarāśi’s criticism of anumāna, the paper also attempts to provide an explanation to why Indian philosophy and logic did not develop any concept of proper symbols and variables.

A Buddhist Theory of Persistence: Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on Rebirth

Abstract

The so-called Buddhist momentarists (kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin or kṣaṇikavādin), such as Dharmakīrti and his followers, defend the momentariness of all things. However, with equal force they also defend the persistence of all things, not just within a single lifetime but over an indefinite cycle of rebirth. Naturally, they have an interesting theory of persistence, according to which things persist without being self-identical over time. The theory is best presented in the Lokāyatāparīkṣā chapter of Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha and Kamalaśīla’s Paṅjikā, as they clearly articulate the criteria of persistence without identity. The purpose of this paper is to formulate a Buddhist theory of persistence through the analysis of these texts. Here is the basic formula: Things persist as series (santāna), which is constituted by momentary entities that are causally related as upādāna and upādeya. Upādāna causal relation is demarcated from other causal relations by the principle of changeability with temporal restriction (Ut), and the principle adopts further qualifications to accommodate complex cases and personal persistence. I have addressed a problem that contemporary physicalism might pose a threat to the Buddhist account of personal persistence, and argued that the problem can be evaded by regarding persons as psycho-physical entities rather than strictly non-physical. In its general outlook, the Buddhist theory of persistence is close to Theodore Sider’s stage theory in that persistence is a matter of distinct individuals standing in a special causal relationship. As regards personal persistence, the Buddhist has a stricter condition than Parfit’s IDM thesis, which states that psychological connectedness with any cause is what matters for survival. The Buddhist would say it is moral connectedness (a specific kind of psychological connectedness) with a special cause called upādāna.

Ritual, Self and Yoga: On the Ways and Goals of Salvation in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad

Abstract

Throughout its history, the renowned Kaṭha Upaniṣad has often been described as being both incoherent and contradictory. The aim of this paper is to show to what purpose the text was created. To this end, it discusses the connection of the three paths to salvation depicted in the text, viz. the Agnicayana (a powerful Vedic fire-ritual), the Upaniṣadic method of self-knowledge, and yoga. The first part retraces how in the Upaniṣads, the Agnicayana was transformed into a non-material or mental ritual and linked with self-knowledge. The second part analyses how the various salvation goals (heaven, the World of Brahman, liberation from rebirth) could be related to each other. First, the authors redefined the Agnicayana’s salvation goal, heaven, to make it identical with liberation. Secondly, they introduced self-knowledge and yoga as alternative and equally powerful means to the same end. In practice, however, the new and world-negating methods were implied to be superior to the costly ritual from which they had drawn their authority. Thus, the authors of the Upaniṣad were more concerned with showing continuity between different religious approaches than upholding consistency of content.

Abhinavagupta on Reflection ( Pratibimba ) in the Tantrāloka

Abstract

In the celebrated tantric manual, the Tantrāloka, Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975–1025 CE) and his commentator Jayaratha (fl.c. 1225–1275 CE) establish a non-dual Śaiva theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) (3.1-65) using the key metaphors of light (prakāśa) and reflective awareness (vimarśa). This paper attempts to explain the philosophical problem of reflection from the standpoint of these non-dual Śaivas. It also evaluates the problem in its hermeneutical context, analysing multiple layers of meaning and interpretation. Is the metaphor of reflection only a way of explaining the particular currents of the Śaiva phenomenology represented by the concepts of prakāśa and vimarśa? What philosophical problem does Abhinavagupta seek to solve by complicating the category of reflection and giving it a quasi-paradoxical status? Why does he use the model of the subtle elements (tanmātras) to explain the theory of reflection? What does the ‘untaintedness (nairmalya) of the mirror of consciousness’ mean for his system? These questions form the focus of this paper.

Ceṭṭiyār Vedānta: Fashioning Hindu Selves in Colonial South India

Abstract

This article seeks to pluralize current scholarly perceptions of what constitutes Advaita Vedānta in colonial India. It suggests, in particular, that the tendency to concentrate on the so-called “neo-Vedānta” of a handful of cosmopolitan reformers has obscured other kinds of innovative Vedānta-inspired discourses that have significantly shaped the formation of modern Hindu consciousness. These discourses are indebted, in ways that are only beginning to be understood, to religious traditions rooted in particular regions and vernacular languages. The article illustrates this argument with reference to the Kōvilūr Ātīṉam, a Vedānta-affiliated monastic institution in Tamil-speaking South India founded by Mutturāmaliṅka Ñāṉatēcika Cuvāmikaḷ (1791–1847). Examining the significance of this figure’s life story for the wealthy Nāṭṭukkōṭṭai Ceṭṭiyār merchant community that comprises the Ātīṉam’s social base, the article explores how social aspirations, traditions of monastic authority, and vernacular Vedāntic literature contribute toward a colonial project of caste self-fashioning that I refer to as “Ceṭṭiyār Vedānta”.

Studies on Bhartṛhari and the Pratyabhijñā: Language, Knowledge and Consciousness

Abstract

The article examines the impact the grammarian/philosopher Bhartṛhari (460–510) had on the way the ‘School of Recognition’ (Pratyabhijñā, tenth/eleventh c. CE) elaborated the notion that knowledge and consciousness have a close relationship with language. The paper first lays out Bhartṛhari’s ideas, showing that his theses are rationally defensible and philosophically refined. More specifically, it claims that the grammarian is defending a view which is in many respects similar to ‘higher-order theories’ of consciousness advanced by some contemporary philosophers of mind. In the second part, the paper shows how Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta adopted Bhartṛhari’s scheme without significant alteration.

Mādhyamikas Playing Bad Hands: The Case of Customary Truth

Abstract

This article looks at the Indian canonical sources for Mādhyamika Buddhist refusals to personally endorse truth claims, even about customary matters. These sources, on a natural reading, seem to suggest that customary truth (saṃvṛtisatya) is only widespread error and that the Buddhist should do little more than duplicate, or acquiesce in, what the common man (or “the world”) recognizes (lokaprasiddha) about it. The combination of those Indian canonical themes probably contributed to frequent Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka positions on truth, i.e., that the customary is no more than surface level truth, mere consensus amongst the mistaken, or, similarly, that there can be no right answers or truth claims to endorse about customary matters, as there are no sources of knowledge (tshad ma = pramāṇa) that have them as objects. Tsong kha pa and the dGe lugs pa, by contrast, adopted what I consider to be a philosophically more promising stance, one that recognized the need for a robust normativity: things customary are not just reduced to accepted errors; there are right answers about them that should be endorsed and may well defy current consensus of opinion. Not surprisingly, however, they needed a quite different and even strained exegesis of that same Indian textual legacy.

Non-existent Things as Subject of Inference in Bhāviveka’s Dacheng Zhangzhen Lun

Abstract

This paper is a preliminary study of Bhāviveka’s Svātantrika-Mādhyamika justifications for taking non-existent things as the subject (pakṣa) of an inference, based on his Dacheng Zhangzhen Lun (*Karatalaratna). Bhāviveka’s treatment of inference is similar to that of Dignāga in that the subject is required to be existent. Bhāviveka also holds that, in a conventional sense, words refer to universals and to the existent entities that possess them, while the two are cognised together. However, in his inference for the unreality of unconditioned things, he likens these things (the subject) to a sky-flower (the example, dṛṣṭānta) that never arises and is unreal even conventionally. This paper first demonstrates how taking unconditioned things (being non-existent) as the subject of an inference can be problematic for Bhāviveka. Then, it discusses Bhāviveka’s attempts to address the problems by subsuming the unconditioned things under the domain of conventional reality. The paper concludes that these attempts show his flexibility in terms of what is taken as conventionally real.

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